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ralHistories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Mr. Edward P. Kerlin was awarded the
MORSClayton ThomasAward in 2001. This
interview was conducted on September
21, 2011 at the MORS office in Alexandria,
Virginia.
Bob Sheldon: This is September 21, 2011,
and we’re interviewing Ed Kerlin for the
MORS Oral History program. Let’s start
with your parents’ names.
Ed Kerlin:My father’s name was Luther
McClellan Kerlin, and mymother’s maiden
name was Olive Naomi Brannen.
Bob Sheldon: Tell me about your parents
and how they influenced you.
Ed Kerlin: My father was a hands-on
sort of person. He loved working with ma-
chinery and he loved the outdoors. As
a teenager and young adult he worked in
home construction with his father, who
was a part-time homebuilder. He also loved
baseball. As a young man, and until he got
married, he played for a semi-pro baseball
team that was located in nearby Altoona,
Pennsylvania. My father also enjoyed hunt-
ing and gardening. Thewintermonths were
for hunting but the rest of the year was for
gardening. He could spend hours working
in his fruit and vegetable gardens. The love
of gardening and the love of baseball were
some things that I took up early and have
stayed with me still. After I got married,
playing tennis replaced playing baseball as
my sports passion.
My mother was a stay-at-home mom
who took care of a growing family of six chil-
dren: four girls and two boys. I was the
youngest of the six. I always remember my
mother who, while helping us with our
homework, would tell how she loved to do
‘‘arithmetic’’ in school and would proudly
show us shortcuts she had learned or the
techniques she would use to solve different
kinds of problems.
Neither of my parents had schooling
beyond high school. But they both loved
mathematics and encouraged me, as well
as my brother and sisters, to try as hard
as we could to be good at something and
always strive to succeed in our school
activities.
We lived in a small town outside of
Altoona, Pennsylvania called Greenwood.
I went to a grade school there called the
McKinley School with grades 1 through 8.
After leaving McKinley, I went to Altoona
for the 9th grade at Roosevelt Junior High,
and then grades 10 through 12 at Altoona
Senior High.
Bob Sheldon: What did your dad do for
a living?
Ed Kerlin: He was a machinist who
worked in the Altoona Car Works section of
the Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR). He would
run a lathe or operate other types of machin-
ery to construct or modify parts needed in
the building or repair of railroad cars and
steam engines. He worked at that job mostly
all of his life. Given the growth of the PRR
and the Altoona Car Works from the early
1850s through the Depression era, and even
through World War II (WW II), the railroad
became a work attraction to many people.
During the mid-1920s the railroad was the
major employer in the Altoona area with
nearly 20,000 employees. These car and en-
gine repair works were considered ‘‘the
largest railroad repair shops in the world’’
at that time. My father joined the PRR in
1910 and retired in 1954. He had a long
and varied career with the railroad.
Bob Sheldon: Your parents likedmath, so
you probably had a strong interest in math
in high school?
Ed Kerlin: Yes, I liked math very much
and did very well in it. But I also liked other
subjects, such as chemistry, physics, and
history. That wide-ranging interest, plus
the advice and encouragement of my par-
ents and school counselors, helped me de-
cide which college prep courses to choose
in high school.
When I graduated from high school in
1950, many young men were being drafted
into the Korean War. With no obvious route
to college at that time, I worked at various
small jobs. I worked on a Ford Motor Com-
pany assembly line at their Buffalo, New
York plant, stamping out car bodies and
door assemblies for new cars; as a technician
for a Home Appliance Center in Altoona,
I delivered and installed home appliances
and bottled gas tanks in people’s homes;
and I started working with my sister and
her husband at their restaurant. They

















Military Operations Research, V18 N1 2013, doi 10.5711/1082598318177 Page 77
manage the restaurant during the daytime
hours, while they took care of the evening
hours. I enjoyed the work and the interaction
with customers but it was not completely satis-
fying. I wanted something different and more
challenging.
About this time, the National Security
Agency (NSA), which had been formed inWash-
ington, DC in early 1952, advertised that it was
coming through town on an interview quest. I
applied for an interview, was invited to a meet-
ing, had interviews with a couple of people,
and took a few tests; the NSA folks then went
back to Washington. A couple of weeks later I
got an invitation to visit NSA if I was still inter-
ested. I went to DC, had another interview there,
and was offered a job. In July 1952, I joined the
NSA as a communications clerk.
The nice thing about this particular job was
that NSA provided in-house, on-the-job train-
ing in statistics and elements of probability the-
ory. The training also included techniques of
analysis thatwere found to be useful on the types
of problemswewould encounter. I worked there
until February 1953 when I got a notice to report
to the draft board. Draft day had finally arrived.
Bob Sheldon: Where was NSA located?
Ed Kerlin: NSA had different locations
around theWashington,DC area but themain lo-
cation was at the Arlington Hall Station Army
Post inArlington, Virginia. This locationwas also
home to the Army Security Agency. Prior to
World War II, Arlington Hall had been a junior
college for women. So going to Arlington Hall
Station in mid-1952 was my introduction to
NSA and the Washington, DC area.
In February 1953 Iwas drafted into theArmy,
inducted at Indian Town Gap, Pennsylvania,
and sent to basic training. Of all the people
coming into the Army through the Altoona
draft center, I was the only one that was sent
to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana for basic
training. ‘‘Eight weeks of basic training,’’ they
said. The rest of the group went somewhere
else; I don’t know exactly where.
After a couple of weeks of basic training
there, I got orders to report to CampBreckinridge,
Kentucky to begin a new 16-week period of ba-
sic training with the 101st Airborne Division. I
didn’t know for certain at the time, but the peo-
ple I had worked with at NSA felt that they
might have a chance of getting me back to DC
after basic training if things worked out all
right. Well, the more basic training I took, the less
likely it looked that that would happen. Because
the KoreanWarwas pretty hot and heavy at that
time, it was rumored that our whole unit was
going to Korea.
As it turned out, during the last week of our
basic training, the Korean armistice was signed.
This was late July 1953. As a result, all of our or-
ders were reworked and a third of our unit was
sent to Korea, a third was sent to Germany, and
a third to different places throughout the United
States. I was sent to Washington, DC and was
reassigned to Arlington Hall Station. Because I
was now in themilitary, and not a civilian, orga-
nizationally I became part of the Army Security
Agency but working for NSA. In this situation I
picked up on some of the same work that I had
done previously and spent the next two years
doing cryptographic analysis of enemy commu-
nications and coded messages.
During my work at NSA, I began to think
that this might be an interesting career field. Af-
ter I was discharged in February 1955, NSA of-
fered me a job as a civilian. Given that I had
enjoyed the people, the environment, and much
of the work I did for two years, I accepted their
offer. But it wasn’t too long before I realized that I
didn’t have the proper mathematical or academic
background to advance very far in the organiza-
tion. I really needed to get more education.Work-
ing for a degree in another area of study was also
a possibility. I decided to take advantage of
the GI Bill and apply to college. I applied to
and was accepted by Penn State University. It
was also during this period that I met my future
wife, Barbara Jean Drummond, of Greenwich,
Connecticut, whowasworking as a Russian lan-
guage specialist with NSA. In the fall of 1955, I
left NSA and enrolled at Penn State.
Prior to enrolling at Penn State, I thought
about what areas of study would be important
and what type of academic background I really
wanted. Although I was good in math and had
work experience in it, history was always one
of my favorite subjects. But at the time I was
unsure where you could get a job as a history
major. After much deliberation I decided to
go into chemical engineering. It contained math-
ematics, analytic work, and my high school
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teacher had made the study of chemistry so
exciting.
I stayed with the chemical engineering ma-
jor for the first year. But as I kept reading the syl-
labus for the course load for the next three years,
I found that there was very little chance for elec-
tive courses. The road ahead was loaded with
required engineering courses. Now that isn’t
bad in itself, but I felt I wanted a broader scope
of coursework given the type of education Iwas
looking for. So I switched into the physics de-
gree program. That program, while pursuing
an in-depth study of physics, allowedme to take
manymore elective courses that I was interested
in, such as history, philosophy, and a wider se-
lection of mathematics courses as well.
I graduated from Penn State in 1959 with a
BS degree in physics. Barbara and I got married
in September betweenmy junior and senior year,
so we spent the last year on the Penn State cam-
pus as a married couple. She worked to support
both of uswhile I used theGI Bill to pay off college
tuition and other related expenses. After gradua-
tion I applied to different schools for graduate
work in physics and mathematics. The University
of Arizona accepted my application and offered
me a teaching assistantship in mathematics.
In September 1959 my wife and I and our
two-month-old son moved to Tucson, Arizona,
to begin our next phase of married life while I
attended the University of Arizona. For two
years I was a teaching assistant at the university
as well as studying for my master’s degree in
mathematics. The MS degree was awarded in
June 1961. I stayed at the university during that
summer and continued teaching and taking
courses because my wife was pregnant and
ready to give birth to a second child. At times
I entertained the thought of getting into the PhD
program, but now with a wife and two young
children, I thought I needed a job even more.
Bob Sheldon: Did you have any notable pro-
fessors that you recall?
Ed Kerlin: The professors at Arizona who
taught differential geometry, numerical analy-
sis, and the physics course on cosmology all left
vivid memories for me as dynamic teachers.
Professors at Penn State who taught the physics
course in optics, complex analysis, and philoso-
phy of science were equally very good. Later at
the American University, where I was enrolled
part-time (from 1963–1967) in their PhD pro-
gram, Dr. Steven Schott provided lectures on
fluid dynamics that were clear and compelling.
After Dr. Schott left the university for the Uni-
versity of California, Irvine, I gave up on the
pursuit of a PhD degree. Most of the course-
work was finished, but that’s where it was left.
I should have mentioned before we got this
far that during my time at Penn State studying
physics, I always read the magazine Physics To-
day. I loved reading its articles and the various
topics it covered.One issue had an advertisement
about a relatively new research organization that
had been formed in Washington, DC called the
Operations Research Office (ORO). The ad in-
cluded an appeal for people whowere interested
in the field of military operations research.
The ad made the work of ORO sound very
interesting and quite appealing to me. I wrote
and asked if there was any chance of a college
student being hired for the summer period. As
it turned out,Dr. Ellis Johnson,whowas thedirec-
tor of ORO, had just recently initiated a program
of summer internships for people in college who
were interested in that type of work. So it was for-
tunate that I inquired about a summer job when I
did and that ORO agreed to have me in for an in-
terview. I went to Washington, was interviewed,
and accepted a job offer at ORO for the summer
of 1956. The offer of jobs continued for the next
three summers.
Bob Sheldon: Did you meet Ellis Johnson
himself?
Ed Kerlin: Yes, I met Ellis Johnson as I was
being taken around by the personnel director,
a man named Lincoln Hanson, to the first inter-
view. Dr. Johnson welcomed me to ORO and
said he was glad that the internship program
was attracting interested people to the program.
At the next interview, we went into a room
where there were two people—one at the desk
and the other sitting on top of a safe. The person
on the safe was introduced as Dr. Wilbur Payne;
that was my first encounter with Wilbur. All in
all it was a good series of interviews. They asked
about my interests, my course work, and my
work experiences. A few weeks later I received
a letter from them offering me a job for the sum-
mer. Thus began my connection with ORO.
Because my basic work experience dealt
with the communications analysis I did while
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at NSA, I was assigned to the Intelligence and
Communications Division. One of ORO’s press-
ing studies at that timewas the design, develop-
ment, and data selection for a combat model
called INDIGO—Intelligence Division Gaming
Operations. Lt Gen James G. Christiansen (ret)
was the project director for the INDIGO study.
As a summer intern, I was to help put together
the data, the various terrain boards that were
needed for modeling at the division level, and
to assist in designing some of the governing
rules that they felt would be needed. I was just
a junior analyst at the time, so I didn’t get as-
signed to do much of the analysis. But during
the following summer (1957) I became more in-
volved with the analysis of results that INDIGO
produced.
Bob Sheldon: Was that a computerized
model?
Ed Kerlin: INDIGO was not a computerized
model; it was a two-sided, division-level manual
wargame. The computerizedmodels, asweknow
them now, had not been developed at this point.
The design of the wargame forced players to
make decisions onmilitary events consistentwith
the rules of play and engagement that had been
developed. For example, players could use the
game to address the impact of having or not
having good tactical intelligence and/or tactical
communications available in various types of
division-level operations. With its availability,
the game provided the structure for analysis
of division-level problems and operations for
many of the ORO’s studies. In one particular
study INDIGO was used to produce data on
Army requirements and future capabilities
for acquiring combat intelligence information.
Later, as limitations of the model were revealed,
numerous modifications were made and it was
renamed TACSPIEL. This new model became
ORO’s only division-level tactical wargame.
Wargames are generally designed to bracket
a limited spread of command echelons. This is
done to minimize the overwhelming amount of
data that could be generated if all the details
of lower level units are included in the analysis
of a larger force. As a result, a hierarchy of
models was being developed at ORO that in-
cluded the following: CARMONETTE, a high
resolution, small unit-on-unit or individual
tank-on-tank battle simulation with entities
from small units to companies or battalions;
TACSPIEL, a division-level, computer-assisted
tactical wargame with entities from companies
to divisions; and THEATERSPIEL, a theater-
level, computer-assisted wargame with entities
from brigades to corps and theater forces. By
theater-level, I mean a game whose scope in-
cludes the employment of all military forces in
a theater of operations. Its focus is generally
the operational level of war, which means the
level of war at which campaigns and major op-
erations are planned, conducted, and sustained
to achieve strategic objectiveswithin a theater or
other operational area.
When I came back to ORO in the summer of
1958, the theater-level wargame was being used
more frequently to address force structure prob-
lems and to analyze various weapon system in-
teractions in a combined force environment.
This was the level and area of analysis I was
drawn to and began to enjoy the most. The
thought of having a big picture exposure to mil-
itary operations at the theater level appealed
to me.
In 1961 when I was ready to leave Arizona,
ORO offered me a job and invited me back as
a full-time operations research analyst. How-
ever, by early fall ORO was in the midst of a
name change and would become the Research
Analysis Corporation (RAC). Therefore, in Sep-
tember 1961 when I joined RAC, I think I was
the first civilian hired under the new RAC orga-
nization. Many of the ORO analysts that I knew
andworked with stayedwith the new organiza-
tion. Themain changewas that Dr. Ellis Johnson
was replaced as Director and, along with some
other analysts, left the organization. Dr. Johnson,
I think, joined the Case Institute.
Bob Sheldon: Where was RAC located?
Ed Kerlin: Initially RAC occupied all of the
old ORO buildings. ORO had been located in
various buildings in the Bethesda and Chevy
Chase areas of Maryland, with headquarters
at 7100 Connecticut Avenue. When the name
changed to RAC, all of the same buildings were
kept and occupied by RAC personnel for a time.
But it wasn’t too long before a new buildingwas
built in the Westgate Research Park in McLean,
Virginia to house all of the RAC operations. Of
course, this was before the Cabin John Bridge
(now called the American Legion Bridge) was
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opened over the Potomac River as part of the
Beltway connecting Maryland with Virginia.
So all of the people who were living in Mary-
land at the time had to drive into DC, cross over
Chain Bridge, and drive back out to McLean to
get to work. When the bridge was completed
and people were able to use the Beltway con-
nectingMarylandwith Virginia, getting towork
was so much easier.
When I rejoined ORO/RAC in 1961, I
expressed some interest in working with
THEATERSPIEL. As a result I was assigned to
the Military Gaming Division, under Mr. Alfred
Hausrath as Director. Within the division, I was
assigned to the analysis team of the gaming di-
rectorate. In that position I was able to move
freely among the different teams that made up
both the tactical and the theater-level gaming
groups. That assignment, plus the subsequent
years working in the environment, gave focus
to my analytic view of the world of military op-
erations research.
In the ORO/RAC organization for theater-
level gaming, for example, there was something
like 25 to 40 retired military officers, most of
them brigadier generals (BG) or major generals
(MG), who were hired to work in specific prob-
lem areas. The Director of the theater gaming
group was BG John Hill (ret). Later the Director
was MG Armistead Mead (ret) and later still it
wasMGHoward Ker (ret). With my assignment
to a study group organized like that, where you
could rub shoulders with retired officers, learn
what they did and how they did it in the real
world, and then apply that knowledge to the
gaming area, I felt I was picking up lots of expe-
rience that I would never have gained anywhere
else.
The theater gaming group was organized
into a red team, a blue team, and a control team.
As an analyst, I wanted to understand how the
red and the blue force commanders operated
and how theymight view and react to situations
differently. What were the factors and the situa-
tions upon which the force commanders based
their decisions? I came to understand how the
control group made its decisions to prevent
things that might pose a problem further into
the analysis, given how the red and blue com-
manders made their decisions and designed
their orders. At that point, seeing the big picture
view of the operation unfold gave memore con-
fidence to do the analysis.
Bob Sheldon: THEATERSPIEL, is that spiel as
in the German word ‘‘spiel’’?
Ed Kerlin: Yes, in German it means game or
play. The first acknowledged wargame is gener-
ally thought to be the Prussian KRIEGSSPIEL in
1812; wargame is what it means in German.
THEATERSPIEL and TACSPIEL existed for
a long time at ORO and RAC providing the ana-
lytic structures for addressing many Army prob-
lems at both the operational and the tactical
levels of military actions. When RAC came into
existence, they had a much broader charter for
studies and analyses than ORO did. They were
now taking study contracts from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other military
organizations.One of the early studies thatwedid
for OSD and the Army, using the theater-level
wargame,was an assessment of howdifferent di-
vision force structures would operate on the bat-
tlefield against an enemy like the Soviet Union.
The pentomic division concept was one of
the first structures that we looked at. The pen-
tomic concept refers to a new structure for in-
fantry divisions adopted by the US Army in
the late 1950s in response to the perceived threat
posed by tactical nuclear weapons use on the
battlefield. This was a division organization that
was broken up into elements or groups of five:
five regiments, but no battalions; each battle
grouphadfive rifle companies, a combat support
company, and appropriate field artillery and
service support. The regiments were smaller
and more austere than the regular infantry reg-
iments of the infantry divisions.
This division concept very closely resem-
bled the wartime structures of the airborne divi-
sions that fought with five glider or parachute
infantry regiments. This was no accident as
the top leaders of the Army at this time were
all airborne Generals—Ridgeway, Taylor, and
Gavin. General Taylor felt that an organization
like this should give the divisionmore flexibility
to disperse in the event of a nuclear weapons at-
tack and wouldn’t be so confined or restricted
on the battlefield. The subgroups in the division
should be self-sustaining and should be able to
be employed singly or in combination. That, in
essence, was the division structure as viewed
and gamed by THEATERSPIEL.
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But for the people who actually wargamed
the organizational structure, that’s not how it
turned out. The new structure created a lot more
problems than previously thought. According
to our analysis, the structure appeared to be a
very difficult concept to provide proper com-
mand and control. The communications links
and the lines of command and control were
poorly designed and in some cases removed en-
tirely. The pentomic division structure was aban-
doned in the early 1960s when the Army
adopted, for all divisions, the command organi-
zation of the armored division.
Bob Sheldon:Did you talk to your active duty
counterparts in the Army or did you rely on
these retired general officers?
Ed Kerlin: I didn’t have much interaction
with the active duty people on this particular
study other than discussing the types of data
to be used or possible data sources; but on a later
study I did. I will get to that in a moment be-
cause it was very important and very helpful.
But first I would like to mention the next di-
visional concept analysis that we were asked to
undertake, and that was the ROAD (Reorganized
Army Division) concept. This division structure
put the Army division back to what it looked
like in World War II: three brigades per division,
three battalions per brigade, and three compa-
nies per battalion. This new division concept,
after its initial assessment was completed, was
the combat structure that was used in the the-
ater-level model to address two very large and
important studies that RACwas tasked to partic-
ipate in.
The first study, Project Oregon Trail, was
a high-priority, highly classified, comprehen-
sive study of tactical nuclear weapons employ-
ment. This study involved an assessment of
the interaction of, and the conditions generated
by, conventional and tactical nuclear weapons
being used by and against US and Allied forces
in various European scenarios. The ROAD con-
cept played a central role in this effort. The sec-
ond study was called Mandrake Root. For this
study the gaming group focused on the impact
of chemical and biological weapons being used
by and against this same US and Allied force
structure in similar European scenarios. All of
these studies and analyses were supported by
results of the THEATERSPIEL wargame.
For these studies I was again part of the data
collection and analysis team. As such, I had the
opportunity to go out and visit different organi-
zations and meet with people that were work-
ing on both chemical and nuclear problems.
This included people at the Army Chemical
Corps Operations Research Group (CCORG) at
Edgewood, Maryland, the Aberdeen Proving
Ground, and the Defense Nuclear Agency
(DNA; the predecessor to DTRA, the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency). Some of the analysts
were civilian, and some were active duty mili-
tary. The ability to meet and have meaningful
discussions about what people were learning
at the more detailed level of analysis was very
important to us. Developing insights into how
we could bring their data to a level that would
be applicable to other models at division, corps,
and theater level was our main objective. Visit-
ing other people and other groups provided us
with the information on what kind of data was
available at the lower levels and how it might
be transitioned into a meaningful use at a much
higher level.
Bob Sheldon: Did you use some of the math-
ematical skills you picked up in Arizona to ap-
ply to the problem? Did you use statistics?
Ed Kerlin:Well, not so much statistics at that
point, but the mathematical skills became very
helpful in trying to lay out the design of some
of the analytic routines wewanted to use within
THEATERSPIEL. Even though it was a war-
game, it had analytical representations in the
design of the methodology that provided for
the calculations. So understanding and being fa-
miliar with the mathematics approach certainly
helped in making those designs come about.
A lot of the people we worked with outside
of RAC had their ownmodels that gave detailed
calculations of many different types of opera-
tions. We had many discussions with the de-
signers and the operators of these models to
understand how they addressed the various
military tactics and operations within their level
of interest. These discussions, plus model docu-
mentation, helped us to understand what opera-
tions were important and what level of detail
was important. Our hope then was to take this
knowledge and understanding of these military
concepts and the required analytic representa-
tions and to fit the results to the higher-level
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echelons of the models that we were working
with.
You had asked earlier if we ever worked
with active duty military from outside of RAC
to provide a ‘‘military view’’ of the problem.
One very important study that RAC was asked
to do by the OSD and the Army was a gaming
study and analysis of the new Air Assault Divi-
sion. In the spring of 1962, SecretaryMcNamara
ordered a panel of distinguishedmilitary leaders
and civilian experts to re-examine the aircraft
needs of the Army. This panel became known
as the Howze Board and it was granted sweep-
ing powers to conduct tests, stage wargames,
and study combat in various areas of the world.
The findings of the Howze Board outlined the
requirements for an Air Assault Division. The
tasking that RAC received to wargame the Air
Assault concept was a result of output from
the Howze Board meetings.
THEATERSPIEL at the time didn’t have
a lot of detail on how to handle the interaction
of armed helicopters with other combat ele-
ments on the battlefield. So it became a challenge
to us to design various analytic techniques that
would incorporate not only the warfighting ca-
pabilities of the armed helicopters but also the
transport and mobility of the heavy lift helicop-
ters on the battlefield, i.e., the logistic support
provided by helicopters and ability of helicop-
ters to move heavy equipment, such as artillery,
into combat areas.
Most civilian and military analysts at the
time had little knowledge of helicopters and
their combat potential. Military tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures had to be created for
this division structure even as the structure
changed on an almost daily basis.
Wewere very fortunate to have two very ex-
perienced helicopter pilots, who had flown in
Vietnam and were now in the United States,
temporarily assigned to RAC to help with this
study. These pilots provided us detailed infor-
mation on tactics and operations and sometimes
scary discussions of what they didwith helicop-
ters during their time in Vietnam, and how they
thought helicopters could be used for surveil-
lance, for target acquisition, for armed reconnais-
sance, and for armed attacks. It was through
these daily interactions that we learned how
helicopters really were being used by people in
the field and what sort of operations and as-
sessments we had to design into our gaming
methodology.
Bob Sheldon: What year was that?
Ed Kerlin: Early to mid-1960s. I think it was
from late 1962 to early 1964.
Bob Sheldon:Was it after the Ia Drang battle?
Ed Kerlin: The Ia Drang battle occurred in
November 1965. Our analysis was done before
then.
In answer to your earlier question, that was
one research activity where active duty military
came to RAC and provided us with hands-on
experience with respect to the types of equip-
ment we were analyzing. Their input helped
us to design and then carry out the analysis of
the Air Assault concept studies. I’m sure there
were other RAC studies that used active duty
military as well.
RAC and the theater gaming group were
later involved in a rather large study called
ARCSA, Aircraft Requirements for the Combat
Structure of the Army. In this study the Army
wanted to know how many of these different
kinds of helicopters should be in the Army force
structure— not only for logistics and transpor-
tation, but also for armed combat, surveillance,
target acquisition, etc. The basic knowledge that
we had gained about helicopters and their
unique capabilities in combat from doing the
Air Assault analysis provided a strong starting
point for this new requirements study.
The ARCSA study was my last study with
the theater wargaming group. But there was an-
other interest of mine that I wanted to pursue
that would still keep me involved in theater-
level analysis if I could persuade the powers
that be to let me do it.
My objective was to develop a different ap-
proach to the analytic assessment of combat op-
erations at the theater level but designed in a
way that reduced the long time it took to evalu-
ate a campaign or a major operation using the
wargaming models. The wargames were able
to do a lot of detailed analyses, but it took days
to come to a resolution of one campaign event
or even weeks to months to resolve the entire
campaign.
I convinced the director of wargaming,
Mr. Larry Dondero, who had taken over that
position from Mr. Al Hausrath, to let me put
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together a research team to develop a computer-
ized version of the theater-level wargaming
model and all of its capabilities. There had been
a manual Quick Game built at ORO by Jimmy
Johnson and Dick Zimmerman some years ear-
lier that made a quick but not too detailed anal-
ysis of theater combat. This game was used as
a rough way to address what THEATERSPIEL
would do in more detail, but it never got any
further than a hands-on Quick Game.
By knowingwhatwehaddone in the theater-
level gamingmodel, I worked to merge the quick
analysis of Quick Game and the broad scope
view of THEATERSPIEL into a computerized
theater-level combat model. We realized that
the utility of quick gaming could be greatly
increased if other assessment models were
added. Using the existing Quick Game as the
basic ground combat model, three new models
were added: a tactical air operations model, a
theater-level logistics model, and a tactical de-
cision model. The first operational version was
called the Computerized Quick Game. It was
a fast running simulation that could be used
to measure in quantitative terms the effective-
ness of combat forces of different types, along
with their logistic support, interacting in vari-
ous theaters of operation under varying levels
of troop availability.
One reason it was pursued so vigorously
was in response to a request for a study that
we got from Dr. Larry Lynn in the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD).Dr. Lynn,
who was head of Strategic Mobility, envisioned
a theater-level combat model that, in combina-
tion with other logistics and cost systems,
would assist in the analysis of competing stra-
tegic deployment means. OASD already had
available a RAC linear programming model
for the design of strategic deployment systems
to meet worldwide operational contingencies.
There was, however, no combat model available
to determine themilitary value of changes in the
rate of arrival of troops and supplies during the
initial deployment or the subsequent buildup.
That is, no combat model available was both
complete enough and operated with the speed
necessary for a rapid determination of the re-
sults of changes in the overall situation.
That was the concept that we pursued for
the OASD study, and with this fast-executing
combat model we were able to do a lot of sensi-
tivity analyses on specific aspects of the prob-
lem posed by Dr. Lynn. As with many first
versions, we understood the limitations of the
model. At that time there were not a lot of de-
tailed aircraft versus SAM (surface-to-airmissile)
interactions in the model and there was not a lot
of detailed logistics play in the model. I pro-
posed to embellish the model with a lot more
detail and design in certain areas: improve the
air-to-ground assessment routines; improve the
routine that allocates aircraft types to various
combat missions; improve the assessment of
SAMs versus aircraft interactions; and extend
the play of logistics by making it more detailed
in terms of how it would support or not support
the combat operations.
This revised and improved theater-level
model was called ATLAS (A Tactical, Logisti-
cal and Air Simulation). It was one of the first
fully-computerized theater-level models that
encompassed detailed air, ground, and logis-
tics operations, plus having internal decision
rules that drove the allocation of resources on
a theater-wide scale.
Bob Sheldon: Did you do some of the com-
puter programming yourself or did somebody
do it for you?
Ed Kerlin: No, I didn’t do any of the pro-
gramming; I was mainly doing model design
but interacting frequently with the programmer.
I had taken some computer courses at Arizona,
but I thought it would be more cost-effective
for someone else who hadmore technical know-
how to do that portion of the work.
The study team that I put together included
a retiredArmy colonel named Bob Colewho had
been around wargames for many years. Don
Mader helped with the design of the decision
model logic and did research on appropriate
data sources. The programmerwas Jim Pomeroy,
who did a very good job and interacted very ef-
fectivelywith the other analysts. The othermem-
ber of the team was a young exchange analyst
from the UK who worked for the British Army
Operational Research Establishment (AORE).
RAC had an analyst exchange agreement with
AORE at the time and Dudley Edwards, who
was already on his two-year assignment, agreed
to work on the model. He helped to design, de-
velop, and collect data for the logistics portion
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of the Computerized Quick Game and ATLAS.
Thus, we had an international research team,
so to speak.
During the late 1960s, ATLAS was used on
a number of studies for the JCS (Joint Chiefs
of Staff), OSD, and the Army that focused on
the analysis of war plans and force structure is-
sues in various theaters of the world.
In parallel with my work on ATLAS, I was
a member of another project at RAC that was
tasked to design, develop, and implement an
‘‘automated force and weapons planning sys-
tem.’’ This effort was called the FOREWON
(an acronym for force and weapons) project.
Other members of the project included Jack
Newman, LeeWentling, Eli Schneider, and Paul
Levy. FOREWON was designed to assist plan-
ners in determining a modernized future force
structure in terms of the required types and
quantities of major end items of equipment. It
was basically a systems approach to force plan-
ning. The systems were existing models that
could be used to assess the required functional
areas of the problem. Using this systems meth-
odology, planners could look at a particular the-
ater over time and determine what units were
required and when they were required depend-
ing on the level of combat activity within the
theater.
The study team decided that ATLAS should
play a major role in this system concept because
it provided the structure for analyzing the capa-
bilities of various force designs and their comple-
ment of current and projected weapon systems
over awide range of scenarios and geographical
locations. Other RAC-developed models in this
planning system included: a linear program-
ming model for the design and assessment of
strategic deployment assets; a force round out
model called FASTALS (Force Analysis Simula-
tion of Theater Administrative and Logistical
Support); a force integration model provided a
single force structure that was able to support
all of the theaters for which troops lists were be-
ing developed; and a force cost model com-
puted the costs of developing the proposed
force and maintaining it in peacetime. The
FOREWON project began in mid-1967 under
the sponsorship of the Assistant Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army. At its completion in late-
1969 the FOREWON system had met all of its
objectives andwas adopted by the Army as part
of the Army Planning System.
Later, parts of theFOREWONsystem,namely
ATLAS and FASTALS, were used by the Army
(HQDAand theArmyConceptsAnalysisAgency,
CAA, now called the Center for ArmyAnalysis)
in their first Total Force Analysis (TFA) force
planning effort. The TFA was later renamed
TAA (Total Army Analysis). The TFA/TAA
methodologies had a very different construct
and solved a different set of problems than
FOREWON had been designed to do.
This was toward the end of 1969. The Viet-
nam War was winding down. There was not a
lot of contractual support available due to DoD
budget constraints for the areas of research I
was interested in. And there were rumors going
around that RAC was either going to be taken
over or possibly sold to the General Research
Corporation. It was at this time I decided to leave
RAC and join a friend of mine at the Resource
Management Corporation (RMC), a new com-
pany in Bethesda, Maryland that did consulting
work for government and industry. I worked at
RMC for a short time on contractswith the Trans-
portationDepartment and the LaborDepartment.
A contract with the Army led to a methodology
for evaluating future combat systems and a re-
port with the title ‘‘The Design of a Preferential
Analysis Methodology for Evaluating Future
Land Combat Systems.’’ The model construc-
tion was completed in early 1971.
It was during this time that I was ap-
proached by Dr. Jerry Bracken, who worked for
the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), to give
a talk on my experiences in building the Com-
puterized Quick Game and the ATLAS model.
IDA had a contract with the Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) to build a very large
general-purpose forces planning model—a re-
search study area that focused on issues I had
previously dealt with at RAC. One difference
was their concept was much broader because
they intended to include Navy forces in the de-
sign. So I went to IDA and gave a talk on what
I had done at RAC. They liked what they heard
and asked me if, as a consultant, I would work
with them to help design the air-ground portion
of their general purpose forces planning model.
In early 1971, as a consultant from RMC, I
went to IDA and began working on the design
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of the air-ground portion of the model. Mem-
bers of the team included Dr. Jerry Bracken;
Dr. Bruce Anderson, a mathematician who also
hadmilitary service in the VietnamWar; Dr. Alan
Karr, a mathematician from Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity; Elly Schwartz, an MIT-trained mathe-
matician; and others who helped with various
parts of the effort. The detailed ground and air
portion of the model was called IDAGAM (the
IDA Ground-Air Model). The portion that dealt
with the naval forces focusedmainly on the sur-
face navy and the sealift activities of the force
andwas called the SEALIFTmodel. The IDAGAM
work was completed in the early 1970s, was
tested in various scenarios, and later modified
to become IDAGAM II. The model was turned
over to JCS for use in general-purpose forces
planning studies
It should be remembered that this model
development was being done at a time when
the use of tactical nuclear weapons and their im-
pact on US conventional forces were still of in-
terest to the military. Because I had worked with
tactical nuclear weapons assessments in the
RAC theater gaming model during the Project
Oregon Trail studies, I knew what a workable
structure should look like. So in discussions
with others on the Joint Staff, I proposed taking
the IDAGAMmodel that we had just developed
and modifying it to portray the employment
and assessment of tactical nuclear weapons.
This proposal was made to the JCS J5 and they
agreed. At this point I joined IDA as a research
staff member and began to develop the detailed
work statement.
In 1973 we were tasked to build a model
based on the work we did for IDAGAM but to
make a more detailed and broader scoped
ground-air model that included the delivery
and assessment of tactical nuclear weapons.
The organizational structure at the time had
IDAworking through WSEG (the Weapon Sys-
tem Evaluation Group) for most of its contracts
with OJCS. Any IDA task order had to be cleared
through the WSEG office before it could be
worked.My first briefing on this tactical nuclear
concept was to its director, Lieutenant General
Glenn Kent. But, as we all knew, working with
and briefing General Kent was another matter.
It was very difficult to get a briefing past him
that included a lot of briefing charts or flow
charts. You had to really explain yourself to
him and what you wanted to do independent
of what was on the chart. After many tries, we
got through the concept briefing and had his
acceptance. One of his comments to me was,
‘‘Looks to me like you have at least a 10- or 20-
year career ahead of you in this modeling area.’’
His view was correct but he was short by about
12 or 15 years. The model we were developing
was called TACNUC (Tactical Nuclear). This
model withmultiple modifications and enhance-
ments became the TACWAR (Tactical Warfare)
model. As of 2010 the model, with many
changes, was still being used to support some
ongoing IDA studies. Initial game operation in
1978 and continuing through current days is
a 30-plus year run.
TACNUC became TACWAR for the follow-
ing reason. As we neared completion of the nu-
clear and conventional weapons assessments in
TACNUC, the military became very concerned
about what the Israelis had found in the after-
math of the 1973 Middle East Yom Kippur War.
Their concerns revolved around the types of
Soviet-made chemical equipment and chemical
protection of various designs that were found
on the battlefield. These findings set off alarms
thatmaybe the Soviets were pursuing a chemical
warfare capability much more extensively than
we had given them credit for at that time.
The JCS wanted us to take TACNUC and
incorporate chemical and possibly biological
weapons into the same combat structure. With
a concerted effortwedesigned chemicalweapons
employment and assessment into the model.
This new model, with the capability to assess
a combination of conventional, chemical, and
nuclear weapons employment at the theater
level, was called TACWAR. This work on the
model was completed in 1977 and turned over
to the JCS Studies Analysis andGamingAgency
(SAGA). An extensive and agreed-to database
for themodelwas completed the following year.
The first IDA study using TACWAR began
in late 1978. This study focused on the use of
chemical weapons by assessing the vulnerabil-
ity of the US military posture in central Europe
to a chemical attack by the Soviet Union.
Bob Sheldon: Who did you tap for expertise
on chemical and biological munitions effects
modeling?
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Ed Kerlin: Previously I had worked with an-
alysts at the chemical center at Edgewood,
Maryland when I was doing data research for
the RAC Mandrake Root series of studies. That
was my first source for expertise on how to han-
dle this problem within TACWAR. The analysts
there thenwereMattHutton andDale Sloop plus
others who worked on chemical and biological
weapons analysis. Other sources included the
Natick Labs at Natick, Massachusetts for infor-
mation on individual chemical protection is-
sues; Dr. Ralph Goldman’s research on heat
stress issues of chemical protection; Dr. Clyde
Repologle in the Aerospace Medical Research
Lab at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
for results of chemical attacks on US tactical
air bases; and the Chemical Section in US Army
DCSOPS under COL Gerald Watson (later to
becomeMGGeraldWatson, Commander Chem-
ical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama from 1985–
1989 and later in 1989–1992 as Director of the
DNA) for insights into the employment of chem-
ical weapons and the results of field tests on the
loss of individual and unit combat effectiveness
in a chemical environment.
There were also detailed chemical models
being developed by different research groups
in support of chemical corps efforts. One model
was called CHEMCAS, the Chemical Casualty
model, and it was being developed for use at
Edgewood. Themodel depictedwhat the effects
would be to an individual target if it was hit by
various types of chemical weapons from differ-
ent delivery systems. This was the type and
level of data that we were looking for. By mak-
ing many runs using CHEMCAS we were able
to accumulate a wide range of results and a
deeper understanding of the effects of chemi-
cals weapons on individual targets. These re-
sults provided insights into how we might be
able to develop amore detailed chemical assess-
ment within TACWAR.
But the biggest support in this overall effort
was the work and assistance of Dr. Leo Schmidt,
an IDA analyst. Leo was a very experienced
programmer-analyst who previously worked
for the Illinois Institute of Technology and had
experience in nuclear weapons testing. He had
also worked on Civil Defense issues for IDA do-
ing analysis of strategic nuclear weapon attacks
on cities in the United States. He understood
the dynamics of nuclear effects, the blast effects
and the downwind radiological effects; and he
understood the detailed mathematics of all the
calculations. He was an essential part of the de-
sign and implementation of the nuclear portion
of TACNUC. When it came time to develop the
chemical model, he was a perfect fit. His ap-
proach in designing the chemical assessments
was to do an analytical transposition of the re-
sults of CHEMCAS into an analytic function that
we could use in TACWAR to make it a much
more rapid assessment technique, but still em-
bodying the concept ofmodeling and assessment
that was done in CHEMCAS.
When one considers a chemical attack, there
are three different states in which chemical
agents can be found: vapor agents, liquid agents,
and agents that fall in between these two. To
cover all of these cases, there are three types of
models that have been used in the detailed as-
sessments of these agents. One is called the
Calder-Sutton model used for vapor agents;
the Porton model used for liquid agents; and
the modified Evaporation model, used to cap-
ture those agents that could be in one state or
the other at different times in their life as they
move downwind from release.
The use of these three models as well as use
of the CHEMCAS model was basic to some of
the research that was being done at Edgewood,
and thus became the basis of what wewanted to
do in the TACWAR structure. We were taking
the results of multiple runs of the CHEMCAS
model and using them tomake an analytic func-
tion within TACWAR. As an analytic function it
would be a more rapid assessment than having
to model the individual effects. We must have
run CHEMCAS a thousand times with different
attacks on different kinds of targets, with dif-
ferent wind speeds and temperature, with dif-
ferent levels of individual protection, to find
what the resulting coverage and personnel ef-
fects would be.
In addition, because we were looking at this
problem as a theater-level situation, we needed
to know about more general issues such as:
Howwould the allocation of fire go between dif-
ferent types of targets on the battlefield? What
types of chemical agents would be used on spe-
cific target types? How intense could the level of
chemical weapon use be for certain situations?
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Would these agents be used to impose degrada-
tion on the troops or to generate casualties on
the battlefield? These were the type of questions
we kept asking at different group meetings.
There was one Army chemical officer in partic-
ular, LTC Douglas Schultz, who helped us im-
mensely in these early days to understand the
wide-ranging employment and assessment is-
sues associatedwith theuse of chemicalweapons.
After retiring from the military he joined IDA
and the TACWARgroup and continued tomake
significant contributions to many chemical and
biological studies.
Bob Sheldon: So you got down to the MOPP
(military-oriented protective posture) gear?
Ed Kerlin: Yes, we portrayed MOPP and
MOPP gear in all of the chemical assessments.
In fact, themodel is designed to portray not only
six different stages of chemical protective pos-
tures but also different levels of physical protec-
tion: people in buildings of different types, in
vehicles, in the open, or in foxholes. All of this
had to be covered in our model. We did it with
input parameters that were associated with the
analytic functions we built for those three basic
models.
At the time, people at CAAwere also trying
to develop chemical assessments for the Con-
cepts Evaluation Model (CEM). But they were
taking the approach that you had to basically lift
things like CHEMCAS and fit it into a combat
model at the theater level. This meant a slow
running model, with a lot of laborious calcula-
tions. What we did was try to streamline that
effect to get as close as we could to what the
CHEMCAS output would be, but not lifting
the model per se into ours. Using our analytic
function approach, Leo would say, or I would
‘‘guesstimate,’’ that we were within at least
90–95 percent of what the detailedmodel would
produce. That was pretty good for the type of
rapid assessments being done and results that
we were getting with this kind of a model and
our analytic approach.
So that is TACWAR. A theater-level combat
simulation that incorporates the assessment of
conventional, chemical, and nuclear weapons
effects, as needed. We set about to do a series of
studies for various groups within the JCS, the
OSD, the DNA, and the other agencies interested
in these types of problems at the theater level.
An interesting set of events occurred in the
mid-1980s that made the model run faster, be-
comemore user-friendly, and as a result accessi-
ble to more people. Dr. Robert Atwell, who had
just returned from IDA’s field office in Europe,
joined the TACWAR study group and proposed
that we convert the combat simulation to be op-
erational on a personal computer (PC). Prior to
this time all TACWAR runs were made on a
large mainframe computer with tape drive in-
put and massive amounts of computer output
as its results. His work converting the extensive
computer code of the simulation to be compati-
ble with PC rules and operations, aswell as stor-
age limitations, was widely appreciated. The
process of structuring and processing input for
the model was greatly simplified; and the out-
put results, which now appeared on one’s own
computer, were suddenly accessible and man-
ageable. Bob stayed with the study team until
the early 2000s providing helpful computer ex-
pertise, project leadership, and overall assistance
in the design modifications, data development,
and applications of the model in support of
many important studies.
Bob Sheldon: The term VV&A for Verifica-
tion, Validation, and Accreditation probably
wasn’t around at the time, but did you do any-
thing comparable to VV&A back then?
Ed Kerlin: We did not do any formal VV&A
initially, although we had compared model out-
puts and their underlying concepts, methodolo-
gies, and processes, which are elements of what
is now considered VV&A. As you indicated, it
was not the thing that was being thought about
at that time. It was only later on, in the late 1980s
or early 1990s, when these terms became more
applicable to the models that were being devel-
oped. Of course, you must remember that the
1970s and the 1980s was the period of greatest
model expansion in the United States. Every
agency and every research group either had or
wanted amodel to address certain issues or con-
duct some type of analysis.
At some point the JCS Joint War Games
Agency (JWGA)—which later became the Stud-
ies Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA) —
decided that, with this proliferation of models,
maybe it was time to look at all the models that
were being used and see if there was any way to
verify the validity or the accuracy of what the
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models were producing. At IDAwe tried to pro-
vide the accuracy, at least with the chemical por-
tion of TACWAR, by using results of the more
detailed models being used at Edgewood. We
felt pretty comfortable there. The conventional
ground-air combat models were more suspect
because there were different methodologies and
data sources used to compute the combat attrition
of people and weapons in a combined arms envi-
ronment, and it was not clear which ones were
more appropriate.
Most detailed models would start with data
provided by the Joint Munitions Effectiveness
Manual (JMEM) or from field tests or field ex-
periments. JMEM was developed to provide a
set of detailed data on the characteristics and
performance of weapons and weapon systems
in order to generate weapon effectiveness esti-
mates. These data would indicate how effective
a certain weapon or weapon system is against
a given target depending on the type of muni-
tions being used and other environmental ef-
fects. This worked well for the high-resolution
detailed models. However, as one went to lower
and lower level resolution models, such as
corps or theater-level models, data requirements
changed.
Attrition in earlyORO/RACseries ofmodels
was loosely based on weapon values called fire
power scores. The initial work was done in the
early 1960s at the Army War College, where
they developed scores for various weapons es-
sentially based on the caliber of weapon used.
The value for a rifle was set at 1.0, and as the cal-
iber of the weapon increased, the score went
higher and higher. But this weapon value was
independent of what it was firing at. Over the
years the firepower scoreswere studied, tweaked
and modified based on output from other more
detailed models. But that wasn’t enough to sat-
isfy the community’s desire to find a better way.
In the series of models that IDA started in
the early 1970s, Bruce Anderson, Alan Karr,
and Elly Schwartz pursued the idea that in
the attrition assessment, the value of a given
weapon should, in some way, be a function of
the value of the weapon it is able to kill. That
is, give it the capability to be awarded a higher
value if it is able to kill a higher value weapon
on the enemy side. So they put together a series
of mathematical equations that allowed them to
develop this new weapon value. Thus, for a he-
licopter that’s killing light artillery, the helicop-
ter value may not be very high. But if it’s killing
tanks, it should certainly get a higher value in a
particular application. This approachwas called
the potential/antipotential method. That was
one method of assessing weapon-on-weapon
effects at a lower-level resolution of combat.
Other models, such as the CEM, use a force
potential developed by a number of study
groups that determined what rates were to be
used in given studies. In some models the attri-
tion equations for combined arms combat fol-
lowed the Lanchester theory of combat. Other
models used probability of kill values that were
derived from more detailed models that the
Services were developing.
It also became clear to everyone that the in-
tensity of fire, that is how much during the day
would this weapon actually fire, should have an
impact on what the input weapon score was go-
ing to be. I recognized this problem even back in
the THEATERSPIEL days when I went from the
theater war game to the Computerized Quick
Game. In the theater game the controllers and
players were able to control howmuch the artil-
lery could fire in a given day or a given game cy-
cle. But when you went away from having a
controller decide what these rates should be,
you had to fall back on some automated deci-
sion rule or input factors to the model that
helped determine the rate.
Initially, we looked at the Army field man-
uals and you could see that artillery is capable
of firing maybe 720 rounds a day at max tempo,
but artillery is never used that way for sustained
periods.More likely, when averaged overmulti-
ple time periods it might be 200 to 250 rounds
a day that would be the norm. So you had to un-
derstand in the context of where, and against
what type of target the artillery piece was being
used, what its firing rate should be.
To get a better handle on this problem we
went to CAA, where they were using a combat
model called the Combat Sample Generator
(COSAGE) that looked at the detailed actions
within a type combat division. We realized we
could get from thismodel expected expenditures
of ammunition for a day of battle for the differ-
ent kinds of weapons and munitions in that di-
vision. So we used that expected expenditure
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data as amodifying factor in determining the in-
put weapons scores for the weapons that we
would use in IDAGAM and in TACWAR.
All of this activity doesn’t show VV&A di-
rectly, but at least we were drawing from more
detailed analyses that used input in a more di-
rect manner than we were able to at the theater
level.
As I mentioned earlier, when TACWARwas
built, the sponsors were showing a growing in-
terest in chemical warfare issues. But during
this time there were a lot of problems associated
with even speculating on the use of chemical
weapons—the 1970s in particular. In 1969, Pres-
identNixon signed into law anorder that said the
US would destroy all of its biological weapons,
and it would now have a policy of no first use
of chemical weapons on a battlefield. It didn’t
say that we couldn’t respond to a chemical at-
tack or even study ways to defend against
chemical weapons; we would not be the first
ones to use them.
Other things were going on as well. Because
of the growing civilian abhorrence to what was
going on in Vietnam, to the use of defoliation
with Agent Orange, to the riots within the US,
and to cases of tear gas being used in putting
down uprisings in different places, the public
became repelled by the idea of gas in particular.
At the same time, the Army’s stockpile of
chemical weapons was slowly deteriorating.
There hadn’t been a lot done in developing in-
creased protection against chemical use on the
battlefield. But this wakeup call in the mid-1970s
from the warnings we got from the 1973 Middle
East War gave rise to more interest in what the
Army and the military in general should do
about chemical weapons.
We were tasked by both JCS and OSD to do
a series of studies looking at the impact of chem-
ical weapons use on the US forces and force
structures in Europe. Some studies showed the
impact of not having various types of chemical
protection, or how bad it would be if we didn’t
have a retaliatory chemical capability. Other
studies showed how vulnerable the airbases or
the ports would be to harassing chemical at-
tacks. Other studies showed howwe could turn
the military situation around with better indi-
vidual protection, collective protection for vehi-
cles, better chemical training for the soldiers,
and a retaliatory chemical capability with artil-
lery, missiles, and aircraft. As interest in these
types of studies grew within the military, we
were tasked to include other theaters of interest,
such as Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia.
Obviously, the question now was if we’re
going to start rebuilding our chemical defenses
and chemical stockpile, what types of agents
and what types of chemical delivery systems
should we focus on? So it became a series of
force structure studies focusing on chemical
agents, delivery systems, and defensivemeasures
all in the context of a theater-wide chemical-
conventional operation.
OSD and the Army also became very con-
cerned with how much chemical protection and
chemical defense equipment they would be
dealing with on this chemical battlefield. They
had ideas of protecting everybody and every-
thing, but there’s a limit to how much you can
afford on chemical protection. When we were
asked to look at the problem, it became one of
the first times wemodified TACWAR and incor-
porated amore detailed representation of the to-
tal forces that actually existed on the battlefield.
In the new structure we had target arrays
that portrayed combat units down to company-
level units and artillery units portrayed down
to battery-level units. We also developed com-
bat service support units that covered the whole
range of support forces that characterize the tail
of the combat force. In total, this represented
something like 14 or 15 different types of sub-
units that were deployed on the battlefield that
became targets for either chemical or conven-
tional weapons.
With these modifications we were able to
track all of these units and know that when they
were attacked, what agent was used and the
type of chemical protection they had available.
We employed a series of rules of use or wear
rules that stated, for example, when to change
an item of individual protection if it was shown
by inspection to have been under a chemical at-
tack; or when a mask filter should be changed,
etc. Medical items for chemical defense were
also being represented. In total, there were 35
to 40 different chemical defense items the mili-
tary was interested in. In each run of the model,
we were able to track the chemical weapons use
against these targets; and with the rules of use
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for each item being implemented, determine the
subsequent consumption of these chemical de-
fense equipment items throughout the course
of the battle. This output, when provided for
all the theaters of interest, plus other Services’
analysis, could lead to chemical defense equip-
ment item requirements.
Our first study of this type for OSD and the
Army started in 1986, when we were tasked to
determine chemical defense equipment item re-
quirements based on chemical warfare scenarios
in Europe. In 1988 we were tasked to extend the
analysis to include scenarios in Northeast Asia
and SouthwestAsia.Wewere tasked to do a sim-
ilar two-scenario analysis five years later, be-
cause nothing else in the modeling community
had come along to address the problem.
In the late 1990s, the JRO-CBRND (Joint Re-
quirements Office-Chemical, Biological, Radio-
logical and Nuclear Defense)—which was under
the JCS J8—tasked us to do an analysis of joint
forces and their requirements for NCB (nuclear,
chemical, and biological) defensive equipment
based on updated combat scenarios in North-
east Asia and in Southwest Asia. Using the
then-current version of IDA TACWAR, we in-
corporated not only the new Army rules but
added rules that we were able to develop work-
ing with members of the other Services: Air
Force, Navy, Marines, and the Coast Guard.
Bob Sheldon: Did you capture the classic
Fulda Gap scenario?
Ed Kerlin: Yes, the Fulda Gap scenario (in-
cluding US forces and their defensive positions)
was included in all of the European scenarios
that we considered, but we weren’t focusing
solely on it. The scenarios we analyzed covered
the entire European theater, north to south, in-
cluding Dutch, British, German, and American
forces.
Of course, to get a full view of chemical
weapon issues, such as retaliation against po-
tential chemical-capable forces, or to study
chemical defense issues, such as NCB defense
equipment item requirements, requires that sce-
narios in other theaters of interest (i.e., North-
east Asia and Southwest Asia) be included in
the assessments.
Bob Sheldon: Did you interface with what’s
now DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, or their counterparts?
Ed Kerlin: Early on, in the late 1970s, we
dealt with the DNA whenever we were doing
any kinds of nuclear analyses. Interaction with
analysts at DNAwas very helpful in the overall
construction of and data development for the
nuclear sub-models built into TACWAR. From
discussions with DNA analysts, we were kept
current on happenings in the nuclear commu-
nity and learned how certain analyses were
being done. In addition, we attended the Joint
Service Nuclear Weapons School, sponsored
by DNA, located at Kirtland Air Force Base,
NewMexico.We spent twoweeks at the nuclear
weapons course to get a better understanding of
the nuclear effects of different types of weapons
on different types of targets.
Because DTRA didn’t come into being until
1998, many of the chemical warfare studies that
we worked on were finished before then. The
NCB defense studies we completed after 1998
were sponsored by offices in the JCS or OSD;
not by DTRA. The DoD studies of retaliatory
chemical warfare issues were essentially halted
after the demise of the Soviet Union, but topics
of chemical, and especially biological, defense
rose to a top level of concern in the military.
DTRA, however, is one of the groups that cur-
rently sponsors studies at IDA in the area of
NCB defense focusing mainly, but not solely,
on CB (chemical and biological) sensors, detec-
tors, models, and other technical issues. The
TACWAR model is not being used in any of
these studies.
Bob Sheldon: Can you point to any specific
decisions that the military made based on your
chem-bio studies?
Ed Kerlin: It’s hard to say, because when
some of these analyses rise to the level of OSD
and Joint Staff, Service politics enter in. But I
think our studies addressing the offensive chem-
ical warfare capability of the militarymight have
supported decisions on types of chemical deliv-
ery systems the weapon planners should focus
on, and to a degree on how many. The studies
across different theaters on a worldwide basis
also provided insights into the possible size
and makeup of an effective retaliatory chemical
stockpile. Also, our studies on worldwide con-
sumption of chemical defense equipment items
provided the basis for planners to understand
and manage the magnitude of that problem.
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Taken together, the results of all of these studies
highlighted the need and importance of individ-
ual and collective protection for the force and for
specific training on all aspects of operations in
a chemical-biological environment.
One of the most surprising things that ever
happened to me occurred on Capitol Hill. I was
asked by the sponsor in OJCS to brief the results
of our study on chemical warfare operations in
Europe to a working group in Congress. Every-
body listened very intently. At the end of the
briefing, the first question I was asked was,
‘‘Don’t you think it’s immoral to be studying
this type of problem?’’ ‘‘Immoral?’’ I asked.
‘‘Why should it be immoral? After all, you have
an enemy here who doesn’t look at it as im-
moral; an enemy who can do very devastating
things to us if allowed and if we are not pre-
pared.’’ I was taken aback and rather surprised
by that kind of a question. But in hindsight, I
think that was the mindset of people at that
time. Civilians, overall, were not fully support-
ive of chemical agents or chemical weapons or
chemical warfare, and maybe this person was
representative of the group.
The chemicalwarfare area remained amajor
study area for the TACWAR team for a number
of years, from the late 1970s to well into the late
1990s. During this time we conducted more
than 20 studies and provided 30 reports on the
results of our work.
However, there were other research areas
that we focused on using the capabilities of
TACWAR that were done in parallel with the
chemical warfare studies They included MBFR
(Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions); Anal-
ysis of Competitive Strategies; Assessment of
Conventional Initiatives; Force Assessments for
theQDR (Quadrennial Defense Review); Analy-
sis of Follow-on Force Attacks (FOFA); FY-95
Heavy Bomber Force Study; and theDeepAttack
Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS).
The reason we were able contribute to these
newer study areas is that TACWAR has the ca-
pability to portray targets at various depths of
the battlefield and to assess attacks against these
targets with a wide range of munitions and
weapon systems guided by various target ac-
quisition systems. Other theater models, such
as CEM at CAA, do not present the same level
of detail in weapon-to-target assessments deep
into the battlefield. CEM has a lot of detail in
the representation of combat from the on-line
units through division rear and possibly into
the forward part of corps. But targets in the rear
of corps and throughout the theater don’t exist
in such detail.
By the mid-1980s, the Systems Evaluation
Division (SED) at IDAhad been doing a lot of re-
search on capabilities of new weapons systems
and how one weapon system might compare
in cost and effectiveness to a competing weapon
system for a specific mission. These studies
were done for a number of years for OSD, and
with good support. But at some point, OSD de-
cided they needed to address these issues in a
broader context.
So as a member of an IDA SED study team
we used TACWAR in supporting analyses to
assess the military worth of the various mixes
of weapon systems utilizing different muni-
tions in a theater-wide operation. This study
was called the Follow-On Force Attack (FOFA)
study. In most scenarios, the Soviet forces had
many types of on-line combat divisions as well
as second and third echelon forces flowing into
the theater. The intent was to establish the most
appropriate cost-effective mix of munitions and
weapon systems to attack and defeat these fol-
low-on forces. We relied on scenarios that OSD
provided to address these problems.
For a couple of yearswe addressed the issues
of using specific systems: warheads on missiles;
specific armaments on aircraft; and the ways
those missiles and aircraft could be used on in-
terdiction missions, close air support-type mis-
sions, airbase attack missions; with different
command and control and other sensing sys-
tems providing the information and intelligence
to conduct the attacks; and to determine in the
long run their contribution to the battle. In the
end, OSD felt they had a better understanding
of these weapons systems, their costs, their ca-
pabilities, and their contribution to the battle on
the basis of how they were used in a combined
force-on-force theater-level analysis.
In conducting these analyses we didn’t stay
with just one fixed allocation of weapon system
to typemission or target. Bymeans of sensitivity
analyses we were able to look at many different
allocations of aircraft to different types of tar-
gets, of deep attack missiles to different types
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of targets, and how by varying these systems
and their allocations would provide to the US
forces a more effective capability in fighting the
Soviet follow-on forces.
Bob Sheldon: What year was that study?
Ed Kerlin: The Follow-On Forces Attack
study was done in the late-1980s, from 1985 to
1989.
The FOFA study led to other studies in the
1990s that focused on theater-level force issues,
some involving advanced weapon systems and
munitions, some involving chemical weapons
use.
One study that got high-level attention
within the Joint Staff was the 1991 pre-invasion
assessments of US and coalition forces in a the-
ater operation in the Persian Gulf region as part
of Desert Shield andDesert Storm. IDATACWAR
with its more detailed chemical assessment rou-
tines was chosen to evaluate numerous force
employment options in the face of potential en-
emy use of chemical weapons. Both the JCS J5
and US CENTCOM (Central Command) pro-
vided data and analysts to support IDA in these
assessments. IDA analytic teams were active
both in the Pentagon and at IDA.
A lot of these studies that I have mentioned
overlap in time because I had a number of dif-
ferent analysis teams working the TACWAR is-
sues. Some would do the chemical warfare
analysis, some would do the FOFA analysis,
and some would do the CB defense equipment
item assessments. At one point in the mid-1980s
to mid-1990s, as many as five different teams
might have been active doing different study
area analyses.
The FOFA studies provided the basis for an-
other large IDA study in the mid-1990s called
the Deep AttackWeaponsMix Study (DAWMS).
In this study we used not only the weapon sys-
tems and analysis techniques that we had used
in the FOFA studies, but we added the heavy
strategic bomber force to the analysis and cre-
ated extensive changes in the target acquisition
portion of TACWAR as directed by the C4ISR
(command, control, communications, computer,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance)
Tiger Team that had been formed for the study.
But to fully understand IDA’s involvement
in the DAWMS, we must go back a few years.
In 1994, IDA was tasked to do a comparative
analysis between the B-1, the B-2, and the B-52
strategic bombers. That study, the congressio-
nally directed FY95 Heavy Bomber Force Study,
was done in IDA by the SED, with supporting
analyses provided by the TACWAR team. Re-
sults of the study showed a larger payoff from
buying advanced weapons than from buying
more heavy bombers formultitheater operations.
Based on these results USD (A&T) (Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Tech-
nology) directed that a more extensive weapons
mix study be conducted. At the same time
a Commission on Roles and Missions recom-
mended that DoD conduct a study on deep at-
tack capabilities. These requests came together
in August 1995 as the DAWMS Study. But in
February 1996, the President directed DoD to
expand DAWMS to examine tradeoffs among
long-range bombers, land- and sea-based tacti-
cal aircraft, and missiles. So in effect this was
a two-part study with one part being a weapons
mix analysis and another part being a force
tradeoff study. Part I was designed to determine
the cost and effective mixes, in terms of number
and type, of air-to-surface and surface-to-surface
munitions for deep attack operations. Part II
was designed to provide insights on the appro-
priate force size and force mix for deep attack
operations, with an emphasis on answering
the question of how many B-2 stealth bombers
should be produced. In this context the analysis
in Part II would examine tradeoffs among com-
peting weapon systems that are used in deep
attack operations.
The DAWMS study was conducted by the
OSD and the Joint Staff in collaboration with
the Services; IDA provided analytic support. A
number of working groups were established to
oversee the analysis and decide on production
run conditions, model changes, and database
entries. Lower-level working groups attempted
to reach agreement on contentious issues such
as cost analysis, weapon system effectiveness,
C4ISR data, and C4ISR model design.
From the FOFA series of studies, we learned
the importance of timely and accurate target ac-
quisition. As we had demonstrated in previous
studies, each of these individual weapon sys-
tems relied on certain types of target acquisition
means, mechanisms, or systems to bring infor-
mation on specific targets to a position where
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through various processes the systems could
conduct an attack.
Under theDAWMS structure, a C4ISRwork-
ing group was formed to bring together data
from all Services and for all systems so that an
agreed-to model design and database could be
implemented in TACWAR. Using the results of
theworking group’s research, themodeling team
developed a new C4ISR model in the TACWAR
structure, that allowed us to use details of the
component elements and the working group’s
input data, and conduct a more acceptable
C4ISR assessment than had previously existed
in the model.
Bob Sheldon: I remember there were some
feuds among the Services about DAWMS and
how the weapon systems were represented.
Did you get involved in those?
Ed Kerlin: My involvement was real but
rather tangential. It should be remembered that
all database entries andmodel changeswere de-
cided by DAWMSworking groups; IDA did not
have a vote.
But, as one of the groups doing theater mod-
eling for the study, the structure of our model
and how its resources were being used deter-
mined to a great extent how weapon systems
were being represented and how they were be-
ing assessed. The J8 version of TACWAR was
also being used to conduct modeling assess-
ments of these deep attack weapon systems.
Some service concerns focused on ‘‘aver-
age’’ weapon loads for the various aircraft types
on all attack missions. Because neither model
tracks aircraft individually, i.e., by tail number,
it was not possible to load a type aircraft with
a specific weapon load for a specific mission.
The reason being is that not all aircraft of the
same type would necessarily carry the same
weapons on a given mission, especially if they
came from different airbases. Therefore, the in-
dividual loads for a type aircraft had to be aver-
aged over all the aircraft of that type that could
do that mission.
Service members didn’t respond well to
these so-called average loads because in their
view it tended to underestimate the value of
weapons, especially standoff weapons. Other
areas of concern, as I remember, included the
aggregation of new system capabilities and per-
formance measures, and the limited capability
to model stealth aircraft, low altitude helicopter
attrition, and standoff weapons.
The selection of these models and their
use in DAWMS was decided early on. When
DAWMS was being organized, OSD and the
Joint Staff decided that, of all the campaign
models available, TACWAR provided the best
overall portrayal of the many weapon systems
contributing to both land and air warfare, in
both shallow and deep attack operations. The
COMBAT IV model, which is similar in struc-
ture to TACWAR, was not validated nor regu-
larly used by the Services or the Joint Staff.
The Air Force’s TAC THUNDER model treats
air combat in great detail, but because of limita-
tions in its treatment of ground combat, it was
not generally accepted by the Services, the Joint
Staff, or the warfighting commands as a stand-
alone joint campaign model.
The J8 TACWAR model was chosen to be
the main theater battle model for assessing
the results of the campaign in two major com-
bat scenarios. IDA TACWAR, with its more
detailed C4ISR assessment routines, was cho-
sen for the analysis of selected cases and for
conducting sensitivity analyses on force and
weapon parameters. An optimization model
called WORRM (Weapon Optimization and
Resource Requirements Model) developed by
analysts in IDA SEDwas used to estimate a pre-
ferred weapons mix. The combat outcome for
the preferred mix was then verified in both
TACWAR models.
As the results of the DAWMS analysis be-
came available, several significant issues and
data shortfalls were identified. The Joint Staff
and OSD then tasked IDA to conduct further
analyses and provide additional insights in
the following areas of concern: developmental
weapons performance, low altitude operations,
and air defense suppression effectiveness. Their
objective was to understand how these insights
and sensitivities might alter the weapons mix
determined in DAWMS. The overall intent with
this extra tasking was to provide a broad body of
work that would improve DoD’s ability to con-
duct and support joint weapons mix analysis.
Does that answer your question concerning
the representation of Service weapon systems in
DAWMS?
Bob Sheldon: Yes.
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Ed Kerlin: I guess that covers most of the
study areas that involved the use of TACWAR
through the 1980s and 1990s. It is still used at
IDA for questions that aren’t addressed by other
models. But there are newer models now in use
in the analysis community, like JICM (Joint Inte-
grated Contingency Model), which is a model
developed by RAND that has become one of
the campaign models used by the Army, OSD,
and the Joint Staff.
Bob Sheldon: Could you talk briefly about
how TACWAR evolved over the years, how
you got the data for the model, and then por-
trayed the analysis of the output of the model
to your customer? Did that change over the
years in the development of TACWAR?
Ed Kerlin: I think that some of the stages in
its development have already been discussed.
The model evolved from the initial version that
was developed at IDA under tasking from
OJCS. When all the requested changes were
completed and an agreed-to database had been
developed, the model was turned over to the
JCS; but we retained the code and the capability
to run the model at IDA. Therefore, all of the
studies and analyses that I have discussed so
far were done by IDA analysts using the model
version at IDA.
The JCS conducted their force structure
studies with this initial version of the model
for a number of years. But as time went on and
other analysts came on-board, it was decided
that for some of the features amore hands-on ap-
proach would be better. The air component peo-
ple wanted a way to interrupt the model and
make changes to where aircraft would go and
when certain actions would occur. The ground
operations people wanted a way to interrupt
the model and make changes to force locations
or force assignments for specific situations. Some
of these changes required code modifications
and some required additional input data.
All of the input changes were decided upon
by running the model to a point at which, based
on the conditions of the battle, they felt a change
was warranted; the change was made and the
run started again from that point. The full col-
lection of changes when added to the initial da-
tabase now became the new base case.
Later, when J8 wanted to use the chemical
model, they found that providing the necessary
input data was amuch harder process than they
had anticipated. Also, as their analysts rotated
out more frequently than the IDA analysts, they
did not have the same institutional memory on
the model design and development nor on the
chemical data development that IDA analysts
had.As a result theywanted a different approach
to assessing chemical weapons.
In the IDAversion, the structure of chemical
weapons employment allows the user to specify
an amount of chemical agent by type to be fired
at a specific target type, depending on its loca-
tion. The model knows the size of the target be-
cause it is portrayed in a schematic input target
array in the model; and each weapon system
would fire a given agent to the level that the
user asked for—one, two, three grams, etc., per
square meter.
The J8, however, wanted a model that was
more in line with how the Army did chemical
weapon employment; by using a certain num-
bers of artillery volleys per target type. So their
input would show 48, 72, or some number of
volleys of chemical rounds on a chemical mis-
sion. But in the process of converting to volley
fire, they took away the detail of the individual
company, artillery battery, or battalion as a tar-
get. Their approach left the whole division as
the target. Because these volleys were being
fired into specified targeted divisions, they
didn’t know where in the division these volleys
were going or what elements were being hit. I
think they lost a lot of the fidelity of the model
by these changes.
Over the years, J8 made different design
changes and modifications to the computer code
based on the requirements of pending studies
and analyses. Any changes made by J8 were of-
fered to IDA for inclusion in our model. If the
changes enhanced the assessments or added
capabilities to the model, we accepted them. If
the changes made us move away from our
method of simulation, we usually would not ac-
cept them.
In the process of making all these changes,
a committee was formed to oversee and coordi-
nate all the changes to the model. As newer
changes were considered, the committee would
meet and decide if the changes were proper and
how they should bemade. The resulting version
of the model was the configuration control (CC)
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version; sometimes called CC TACWAR or J8
TACWAR. The version of the model at IDA
was called IDA TACWAR.
So are the twomodels now considered to be
close to the same or not? When the two models
were used to evaluate a nonchemical scenario
and neither side saw the exact input the other
side was using, the results didn’t always agree
on every output measure. The differences came
about, I think, in the way resources were used
and allocated in the two models. However,
if the J8 ran a nonchemical excursion in J8
TACWAR and they gave us their input, we could
use that data in IDA TACWAR and get reason-
ably close to the results they got; not exact, but
close. Whether the two models are the same,
it’s hard to say. How resources are used and allo-
cated in the two models makes for different re-
sults; and this, in my mind, although similar in
design, makes them different models. Of course,
results from chemical weapons usage in the two
models are different by design.
But there is another feature of how IDA
TACWAR evolved that I think is very important
to mention. In the early years of the TACNUC
and TACWAR design and development, there
were many different programmers or program-
mer analysts who worked for me to implement
the different subroutines that were being de-
signed. They all did excellent work in the areas
they were assigned, but none really understood
the entire code and all of its intricate interactions
from subroutine to subroutine. But that all
changed in the late-1980s after the code was
moved to the PC.
The one thing that was common from that
point on, in addition to the model, was the per-
son responsible for pulling all of the design
concepts and analysis techniques together into
a workable and coherent computer simulation.
That person was Mary Catherine Flythe. Mary
Catherine is an exceptional person—a smart
and effective analyst with superb computer
skills. Her earliest exposure to the model was
as a contract employee to the Joint Staff where
she was tasked to develop a User’s Manual
and a Programming Guide for the Joint Staff’s
version of TACNUC. Over the years sheworked
with IDA on selected portions of the model, but
starting in the late 1980s she assumed responsi-
bility for the entire code. As such, she would not
commit to programming any new concepts un-
til all details of the designs and their interactions
with other components of the model were un-
derstood. Her probing questions on all aspects
of new routines made us all realize where in
our designs we lacked detail or lacked a full un-
derstanding of the concept. Her attention to de-
tail was frustrating to many but a blessing to
all who used the model and did analysis of its
results.
I think that the process of generating input
for the model changed over time as well. Early
on I relied on analysts at organizations whowere
working on detailed models of high-resolution
combat to provide data that could be modified
and used in lower resolution models. In some
cases we relied on discussions with people at
other organizations who were doing similar
levels of model development to understand
the scope of actions to be considered.
Later on I think that attendance at MORS
Symposia provided a particularly good environ-
ment where we were able to meet and discuss
similar interests with many different people
and groups.
IDA was a very supportive organization in
terms of people going to MORS meetings. At
these meetings, you got the chance not only to
listen to people presenting results of their work
in the various working groups, but also to meet
with them and talk in more detail about how
they approached different problems. I know that
our interactions with people from other like-
minded organizations provided uswith a deeper
understanding of the problems that modelers
face and potential sources of useful data.
We also used results of field tests and field
experiments as much as we could. A series of
field tests conducted by the US Air Force, such
as Salty Demo and Salty Mace provided impor-
tant data on the degradation of airbase opera-
tions when airbase personnel are forced to don
chemical protective clothing. Results similar
to these were provided by analysts at Wright-
PattersonAir Force Base whowere usingmodels
to assess the impact on air operations from chem-
ical attacks by missiles or by aircraft. The US
Army was involved in a large battalion-to-
brigade-to-division field test called CANE
(Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Envi-
ronment) that looked at the effects of chemical
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. EDWARD P. KERLIN
Page 96 Military Operations Research, V18 N1 2013
protective clothing and equipment on combat
efficiency. Data from these field tests along with
the dedicated efforts of personnel at the US
Army Chemical School provided essential data
for our assessment of combat degradation from
chemical weapons use in the TACWAR chemi-
cal model.
Bob Sheldon: That’s on the input side. On the
output side, how you gathered output and por-
trayed it to your customers, did that evolve over
the years?
Ed Kerlin: It did to a degree, but not to the
same degree that the Joint Staff’s model evolved.
Both TACWAR versions can spew out volumes
of data if you want it. Every interaction that
takes place on the battlefield is recorded. You
can get the result of any interaction in a detailed
printout if you ask for it. What we tried to do, at
least what I tried to do in giving briefings or
writing reports, was to summarize results to
a level where the big picture results were under-
standable to me and to a reader or listener; sort
of a general summary of the combat operation.
In more detail one might ask how the air as-
sets were employed in the theater operation.
What was their contribution to the battle? What
impact did the ground forces have? What were
the casualty levels? How much movement oc-
curred on the battlefield? General and specific
results alike were available. Our output tables
did evolve over the years to be more focused
on topics of interest and summarized in ways
to make the analysis easier.
We did not rely a lot on graphical output
from the model. Graphs were developed as
needed. But the Joint Staff, as they pursued their
Configuration Control version of the model, de-
veloped a shell around TACWAR that allowed
them to be a lot more flexible in developing in-
put arrays and providing graphical representa-
tion of output results. We never got quite that
sophisticated. In the IDA version it was more a
human looking at the results, summarizing
them to a level that could bewritten up and por-
trayed in reports and presented as briefing re-
sults. We spent a lot of time looking at the
results, trying to make sense of what they
meant. Sometimes you could get a quick feel
for the outcome and then run iterations on
varying parameters to build a series of charts
showing what the results would be for different
what-ifs that were being addressed through
sensitivity analyses.
I always found that to be the real strength of
the model; not so much that you could produce
the results of one particular outcome quickly,
but rather to look at how results varied when
you did sensitivity analyses on a lot of the pa-
rameters and elements that were in the model.
That was themain reasonwhywe at IDA stayed
with our initial version of TACWAR;wewanted
to keep the quick running analytic model that
we had built and wanted to use it that way.
Bob Sheldon: You mentioned JICM as a suc-
cessor model to TACWAR. Can you comment
about JICM and other successor models to
TACWAR?
Ed Kerlin: One of the potential successor
models to TACWAR was called JWARS (Joint
Warfare System). Some analysts who knew of
the J8 TACWAR and IDA TACWAR develop-
ment felt that there was a level of detail and fi-
delity not being captured in these models that
elements of the military wanted to see included
in some model.
So the JWARS concept was put together start-
ing around the mid-1990s. It was a campaign-
level model with integrated strategic mobility,
theater logistics, and a joint war-fighting capa-
bility built around detailed C4ISR components.
It included Special Forces operations, space
operations, global satellite operations, and por-
trayed chemical weapon employment and as-
sessments in great detail.
I always felt that it was developing into a
very large, complex model that might be very
difficult to use as an analysis tool addressing
force structure issues. It might be a very good
model for addressing specific issues of concern
within a campaign-level context, but I wasn’t
sure how flexible it was going to be in allowing
people to address a lot of what-if questions like
we had been doing. Maybe that was not the ap-
proach needed at this point nor intended for this
model.
This was one of the new models being de-
veloped and became one of the competitors to
TACWAR. It is still undergoing somemodel de-
velopment and change. They recently changed
the name to JAS, Joint Assessment System. At
one point during a development meeting, in
a bit of verbal jousting, Bill Lese, who was then
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the head of the gaming group for the Joint Staff,
and JimMetzger who had previously worked at
CAA before he becameDeputy to the JWARSDi-
rector, wanted to know when I was going to join
the 21st century and get rid of TACWAR. Here
it is 2011 and TACWAR is still going strong.
JICM is the next model you asked about. As
I remember it, a predecessor to JICM, a model
called RSAS (Rand Strategy Assessment Sys-
tem) was developed in the early 1980s with sup-
port from OSD Net Assessment by people from
RAND (Paul Davis, et al.). It was viewed as
a model with worldwide analysis and gaming
capability. I don’t think it saw a lot of use in
the analysis community for a period of time.
In the mid-1990s the Air Force Studies and
Analysis Agency (AFSAA) agreed to be the
government sponsor RAND needed for an in-
ternal development effort that involved air
warfare improvements to the initial method-
ology. In the late-1990s, OSD and the Army
CAA began funding extensive ground model
improvements and it started to attract more
interest and attention. Other analysts at RAND
have been behind the recent surge in commu-
nity interest. I don’t know a lot about how JICM
is being used, but I know that it does require
a lot of user interfacing to develop force assign-
ments and rules of operation. It has been ac-
cepted by the Army, OSD, and the Joint Staff.
It’s my understanding that the Air Force, the
Navy and the Marines all say they don’t object
to JICM as long as it isn’t used for Air and Na-
val force structure recommendations. It’s the
type of model that could be useful in address-
ing the types of problems that currently exist
at the theater level.
Bob Sheldon: You mentioned earlier that you
went to MORS and exchanged ideas. When did
you attend your first MORS meeting?
Ed Kerlin: My first Symposium was in 1963
at the Air Force Academy where the overarch-
ing topic was the role of air defense in the na-
tional military posture. My first presentation
to MORS was in 1966 at the Naval Postgraduate
School when I was briefing the Computerized
Quick Game concept to see what reaction I’d
get from people who were more familiar with
that kind of operation.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of reaction did you
get?
Ed Kerlin: I think it was pretty well received,
possibly because it was something new in the
field. Many people had known of wargaming
and some had done wargaming but they hadn’t
seen any fully computerized games at that
point. At least there hadn’t been any others pro-
duced at that point that worked at the theater
level. So it was a good reception, I thought.
From that meeting we got a lot of good ideas
that eventually went into the development of
its successor, ATLAS, as I mentioned.
That meeting also gave rise tomy first meet-
ing with Clayton Thomas. He was then at the
Air Force Operations Analysis Office, which in
1972 became part of Air Force Studies and Anal-
ysis (AFSA)—which later becameAFSAA. I had
a meeting set up with him to talk about how we
could incorporate the various capabilities of tac-
tical aircraft in a theater-level air-land battle;
how to represent the command and control re-
quired of aircraft in a close air support role;
how to select the best types of aircraft to be used
on shallow or deep interdiction missions; and
from an OR point of view, what other elements
of the air war should we be focusing on to com-
plete the concept we had in mind. And, of
course, data is the first thing that comes to mind
and Clayton asked about it as well. Where do
you intend to get the data?
Bob Sheldon: What has been your involve-
ment in MORS since you attended that 1963
MORS meeting until you were awarded the
MORS Clayton Thomas Award a couple of
years ago?
Ed Kerlin: I was given the award in 2001. So
the time period from 1963 to 2001 covers the
time I spent developing and applying analytic
methodologies to problems of pressing interest
to OSD, the Joint Staff and the Services; working
as a colleaguewith othermembers of themilitary
OR community; and attending MORS meetings
and workshops whenever possible.
Bob Sheldon:Any comments about receiving
that award and being acknowledged by your
peers in the MORS community?
Ed Kerlin: I was really very surprised when I
got the announcement that I had won the
award. I had no idea I was even being consid-
ered for it. The idea of winning an award was
the least thing inmymind. But I was very happy
to get the award and grateful to the Society for
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making it happen. I felt that I had always been
accepted by the MORS community, and I did
a lot of work over the years with different mem-
bers of the community. I wasn’t an active mem-
ber inMORS as aMORS officer, but I went to the
MORS meetings whenever I could. I enjoyed
them verymuch and learned a lot. Sharingwork
experiences with other analysts especially those
whohadmilitaryORbackgroundsorotherMORS
related experiences was very helpful in forming
some of my own analytic views and research
ideas.
One example where this occurred was when
I was asked by the Joint Staff to be a member of
a briefing team going to Egypt. This was a few
years after the 1973 War and near the time of
the Camp David Accords when the DoD was
renewing relations with Egypt. The purpose of
the trip was to show how military OR as prac-
ticed in the US could help the Egyptian military
address some of their pressing weapon system,
force structure, or data issues. US civilian and
military analysts participated in meetings, semi-
nars, and small group discussions with Egyptian
military analysts to help bring this about. The ci-
vilian members of the briefing team, who were
all MORS members, included Dr. Frank Kapper
from JCS J5, Dr. Marion R. Bryson, from the US
Army Combat Developments Experimentation
Command (CDEC), and Dr. Sam Parry from
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). I repre-
sented the IDA nonservice contingent. Other ac-
tive duty military analysts from the various
Services rounded out the briefing team.
All of these meetings led to a very useful
interchange of ideas. In the mornings, our dis-
cussions were with junior-grade officers and
problems they were interested in, mostly at a
lower unit level or individual weapon system
problems. In the afternoons, we met with major
to colonel-level officers and discussed how OR
was viewed and applied to difficult types of
studies at their level of interest, such as the com-
bined arms level of combat. On one evening, we
went to the Nasser Military Academy, where
with 30 or 35 command-level officers in atten-
dance, we provided briefings and discussions
on selected topics of interest.
The experience of seeing how other Service
colleagues and military of another country tend
to view and address problems of this nature
provided very useful insights. We all seemed to
have the samekinds of problems.What is the best
way to address weapon-on-weapon or ship-on-
ship encounters?What’s themost effective design
for combined arms? What are the most impor-
tant elements in force structure design? What
types of data and data sources to use? I found
it all very useful and thought provoking.
Bob Sheldon: I did an oral history interview
of Gene Visco. He had done tests with chemical
and biological munitions. Have you ever
worked with Gene?
Ed Kerlin: It’s interesting that you mention
Gene Visco. As I stated earlier, my first summer
of work with ORO was in 1956. That was the
year Gene was hired at ORO. So he and I came
to ORO almost at the same time. I didn’t work
with him directly on any studies, but I talked
with Gene a number of times over the next few
years onmatters relating to chemical and biolog-
ical weapons. My interest then was in finding
data sources or means of pulling together data
that could be used in THEATERSPIEL to sup-
port the Mandrake Root series of chemical/
biological studies that RAC was preparing to
do. He was very knowledgeable in the use of
chemical and biological munitions and their
battlefield effects through the many tests that
he had done.
Although Gene and I disagree on the utility
and effectiveness of using models to address
military problems, we have stayed friends
and working acquaintances since that time.
It was because of Gene that I started going to
the ISMOR (International Symposium on Mil-
itary Operations Research) meetings in England
and later gave presentations there. Gene’s friend
Ronnie Shephard was the director of the ISMOR
meetings—andGenewas theUSArmy represen-
tative there for a number of years. After one
ISMOR meeting, Gene and I enjoyed traveling
around London and visiting old haunts of his
much beloved Sherlock Holmes character.
Bob Sheldon: You retired from IDA in 1999?
Ed Kerlin: Yes, the end of November 1999.
Bob Sheldon: What have you been doing
since then?
Ed Kerlin: For the past 12 years I’ve been
a consultant, mostly part-time at IDA and occa-
sionallywith other groups or organizations. The
work has dealt with subject matter that I had
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been doing for years. My knowledge of military
operations as related to force structure issues,
weapons assessments, scenario development,
and the effects of, and defense against, chemical
and biological weapons employment have all
been of great value. Knowing the details of
TACWAR and how it could be applied to vari-
ous combat situations has been of immense help
in some of these efforts.
I have also been enjoying spending time
with friends and family—three children and
our three special grandchildren.With the excep-
tion of one daughter and her husband whom
we love to visit in Arizona, our family all live
nearby. We spend time together throughout
the year in many local activities, on trips to var-
ious locales, at the beach, and celebrating holi-
days and birthdays. My wife and I both like to
travel and we try to take one or possibly two
major trips a year exploring areas in the US or
on international trips to see new sights and
enjoy new cultures. Attending plays and con-
certs with long time friends adds to the list
of interesting things we work into our busy
schedule.
Bob Sheldon: Have you ever visited the bat-
tlefields where chemical munitions were used
during WW I?
Ed Kerlin: No, I have not. But I have visited
a few WW II battlefield sites in Europe. I have
been toGermany a few times,mostly visitingwith
the OR groups there. I have been to The Hague
and to Brussels a few times and given briefings
there. But I’ve never visited the WW I chemical
battlefields. That is something I’d like to do.
Bob Sheldon: Do you have any parting com-
ments to the MORS community?
Ed Kerlin: I hope that MORS keeps its organi-
zation going as it has in the past. As I said before,
I found going to MORS Symposia and various
workshops very useful and informative. I found
meeting with other analysts very helpful in ex-
pressing my views and ideas and getting com-
ments and insights concerning those ideas. I
have tried over the years to keep in touch with
other analysts doing similar kinds of work so that
togetherwe could expand our understanding and
knowledge of how to do things to help support
the overall analytic community. I found MORS
averyuseful venue inwhich tomake this happen.
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